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3Within one week of his election to the Presidency of the new Fifth Republic, de
Gaulle had adopted a radical plan for stabilising the French economy. Largely the
work of the committee chaired by the right-wing Inspecteur des finances Jacques
Rueff, the plan entailed cuts in public expenditure, increases in taxation, a
devaluation of the franc by 17.5 per cent and its convertibility into dollars, as well
as full compliance with the trade liberalization programme of the EEC and the
OEEC.1
The combination of domestic deflation with the liberalization of foreign
trade was quite a novel remedy for curing the persistent twentieth-century
problem of inflation in France. For de Gaulle the commitment to liberalize foreign
trade was nothing less than revolutionary.2 His support for the EEC was no less
so in view of his antagonism to any form of European integration while in
opposition. That de Gaulle took such a revolutionary step in the face of almost
universal opposition form his government was critical for establishing French
leadership in the EEC on the bases of a strong economy. Contrary to warnings
that the beneficial effects of devaluation on the balance of payments would be
quickly reversed, leading to renewed protection and foreign indebtedness,3 that of
December 1958 facilitated the participation of the French economy in the trade
liberalization programme of both the EEC and GATT with one of the fastest
growth rates in Europe.
Why de Gaulle accepted the Rueff plan when Antoine Pinay, his minister
of Finance, along with most other ministers and business leaders, opposed it, has
been explained in a number of ways. For François Caron, de Gaulle’s decision
rested on a combination of power and political will. De Gaulle could take the
tough measures necessary to stabilise the economy because, unlike his
predecessors, he was not at the mercy of pressure groups and political lobbies,
and unlike them he was not prepared to continue borrowing from the United
States to finance the external deficit.4 According to Andrew Shennan it was not
simply because de Gaulle was convinced by Rueff and his advisers that the plan
would reduce inflation and revitalise the economy through the stimulus of
competition, but because he was attracted by its theatrical elements – “the
symbolism of a new franc to mark a new political order, the grand gesture of
carrying out commitments to Europe that the Fourth Republic had given up hopes
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4of honouring and the rhetoric of a coherent plan of renovation as opposed to a
collection of policies”.5
On the other hand, contemporary observers were struck not by the plan’s
theatrical qualities but by the question of whether it had been imposed on France
as a result of Britain’s decision to restore the convertibility of sterling in
retaliation for France’s rejection of the British proposal to set up a Free Trade
Area (FTA). Launched in autumn 1956, the British proposal had aimed to create a
large free trade area for industrial goods covering all OEEC countries in order to
prevent the discrimination which would otherwise arise as the six common
market countries began to liberalize trade among themselves on 1 January 1959.
In November 1958 the French government, after months of prevarication and
apparent indecision, declared its opposition to the FTA.
Contrary to the fears of many French officials and ministers, the rejection
of the FTA by France when it was strongly supported by West Germany and
Benelux did not lead to the collapse of the EEC. What is not clear is whether the
decision marked a reversal of previous government policy, nor indeed why
de Gaulle rejected the FTA which, with its intergovernmental character and larger
geographical area than the EEC, conformed more closely to his stated views on
Europe than did the EEC. Why did he honour the Treaties of Rome when he had
reputedly told Michel Debré, who was to become his first prime minister, “what
use are these treaties? We will tear them up when we are in office?”6
The purpose of this paper is to analyse the reasons for de Gaulle’s dramatic
policy choices in 1958, which, if they marked a reversal of his earlier views on
Europe, were to provide the key to understanding his subsequent policy towards
West Germany, Britain and the EEC.
THE ECONOMIC LEGACY OF THE FOURTH REPUBLIC
Although he was brought back to power after twelve years in the political
wilderness chiefly to solve the problem of Algeria, de Gaulle was confronted
immediately with a number of economic and financial problems which called into
question France’s ability to pursue the campaign in Algeria and at the same time
honour its trade liberalization commitments to both the EEC and OEEC. Since
the second quarter of 1957 France had been running a deficit in its balance of
payments, caused partly by the cessation of American credits but increasingly by
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5the excess demand arising from the enlarged military budget. Rather than cut its
other expenditure or raise more revenue through taxation to finance the war in
Algeria, the Mollet government preferred to re-impose import controls. Thus no
sooner had the Treaty of Rome been signed by the French government,
committing it to the establishment of a customs union beginning on 1 January
1959, than it was demonstrating its inability to sustain any form of trade
liberalization. When the re-imposition of import controls in June 1957 failed to
correct the deficit in the balance of payments it was followed by a disguised
devaluation of the franc in August 1957 by 20 per cent.7 However, the worsening
political situation undermined both these policy measures. On 30 September 1957
the government which ad been led by the young Maurice Bourgés Maunoury
with a slender majority since May 1957 was brought down by the Gaullists led by
Soustelle and forty independents on the question of Algeria. With neither Pinay
nor Mollet able to form a government it was no until 5 November 1957 that a
still younger Radical with fewer political enemies, Félix Gaillard, managed to
form one. Gaillard immediately turned to Jean Monnet, his former boss in the
Commissariat au Plan, to help solve the critical foreign exchange problem by
negotiating foreign credits. The two main sources were Europe and the United
States.
Towards the end of November 1957 the Managing Board of the European
Payments Union (EPU) made it clear that the economic measures taken by France
up to that date fell short of what would be needed for it to secure further credit
from the EPU. Quite simply, if the government could not cut its military
expenditure it would have to cut its civil expenditure, the Managing Board
argued, and honour its commitments to liberalize trade with OEEC.8 During the
negotiations which Monnet subsequently embarked on with the American
Treasury he was left in no doubt that if the aid granted, which in total was to
amount to 657 million dollars, was not successful in finally stabilising the French
economy, further loans would be on terms which would strip the French
government of the last shreds of its autonomy in domestic and foreign policy-
making. The stabilisation measures which were finally agreed on focused entirely
on public finance and credit, as the Managing Board of the EPU had
recommended. Thus, for example, a strict ceiling was to be fixed for the budget
deficit, medium term credit granted by the Bank of France for housing was to be
reduced, and the counterpart of foreign aid was not to be used to meet the current
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6needs of the Treasury as in the past. Unpopular as these measures might be,
Monnet said “mieux vaut risquer une crise polititque que mettre en péril le
crédit de la France”.9
In addition to these domestic stabilisation measures Monnet was later to
elaborate a set of proposals for stabilising France’s external finances within the
framework of the EEC. What Monnet wanted was to build on the very loose
provisions for liberalizing external payments specified under article 106 of the
Treaty of Rome in order to set up a clearing union among the Six. This clearing
union would have a reserve fund, largely financed by West Germany, which
would provide short-term credit for countries with balance of payments deficits as
well as the longer term credit to finance the investment which Monnet considered
to be indispensable for their economic expansion. All the operations of this Fund
would be denominated in a European unit of account – the “Moneur” or
European money which would be as stable as the most stable of the participating
currencies. The Managing Committee of this Fund would meet regularly with
ministers of finance and central bank governors to try to bring their economic and
monetary policies into line. All this was to be agreed with the Germans
beforehand so that it could be announced as a Franco-German initiative on 9 May
1958 – a date of great symbolic importance in both countries.10 But i  Monnet’s
view a precondition for French participation in the clearing union as in the
common market was the devaluation of the franc. However unpopular a measure
it was politically, he saw it as the best, perhaps the only way to bring French
prices into line with international prices, as well as to inspire sufficient
confidence for French capital held abroad (estimated as between six and eight
thousand million dollars) to be repatriated and to attract foreign investment.
Were France to take such a decision the advantages of Monnet’s proposal
were obvious. As a net debtor in the EPU France stood to lose the automatic
credit facilities when it was wound up and currencies became convertible. This
would put greater pressure on French governments to balance their budgets and
would jeopardize spending on public investment or indeed on the war in Algeria.
Depending on when it was wound up, France faced a bill for repaying its debts to
the Union. On the other hand the EEC as a whole was a creditor to the EPU and
together had almost the required number of votes to determine the timing of the
Union’s dissolution. Were the EPU to be replaced by a clearing union in the
EEC, France could continue to enjoy credit facilities to support both domestic
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7spending and the exchange rate. But all this depended on France’s reaching a
prior agreement with West Germany. However, the escalating crisis over Algeria
which brought down the Gaillard government on 15 April 1958, leaving France
on the brink of civil war, ruled out holding any such discussions with West
Germany by 9 May 1958. The return to power of Charles de Gaulle on 1 June
1958 seemed to rule them out definitively.
How de Gaulle would tackle the country’s economic and financial
problems was closely linked to his response to the British proposals for creating a
Free Trade Area in Europe. From the outset in autumn 1956 when the British had
announced their proposal for a FTA the French had faced a dilemma. The same
political concerns which had prompted the then prime minister Guy Mollet to
propose in September 1956 that France and Britain should form an imperial
customs union to keep France out of the common market made the FTA seem
attractive when it was proposed soon afterwards. Clearly any treaty which linked
Britain to western Europe and thereby moderated German power held strong
political appeal in France. On the other hand the British proposal included none
of the safeguards which the French had successfully negotiated for the EEC
Treaty. Thus Britain did not envisage a common policy for agricultural protection
based on common prices and marketing arrangements, insisting that trade in
agricultural products should be excluded form the Free Trade Area. This was
designed to enable Britain to maintain its system of imperial preferences. Nor did
the British proposal envisage the harmonisation of social legislation, the creation
of a common investment fund, temporary safeguard measures to protect the
exchange rate, the setting of a common external tariff, or the inclusion of the
empire and commonwealth. As a result, many officials in the Quai d’Orsay and in
the Ministry of Industry and Trade shared the concerns of French industrialists
and farmers that the British proposal would suit Britain’s economic interests and
harm those of France. The general view was that unlike the Treaty of Rome the
British proposal failed to find a balance between risks and advantages.
However, the head of the Economic Cooperation Section of the Quai
d’Orsay, François Valéry, found these arguments superficial. As he pointed out,
the greatest competition which French industry faced was not from Britain but
from West Germany. This meant that the wider market offered by the FTA could
actually diffuse the pressure from West German industry on the French market.
As far as the safeguard measures to prevent a d aluation were concerned he
argued that a devaluation of the franc was inevitable since the existing policy
protected the least competitive sectors. The advantage of harmonising social
8charges was, he considered, more psychological than real, while the exclusion of
agriculture could actually be advantageous since it would remove one of the many
problems which were envisaged in trying to agree a common agricultural policy
in the EEC.11
What the French National Assembly decided on 22 January 1957 was that
the negotiations for the Free Trade Area were to be concluded as soon as possible
after those of the EEC and to carry guarantees equivalent to those of the Treaty of
Rome.12 It became the task of the Intergovernmental Committee set up in October
1957 and chaired by Reginald Maudling, the British paymaster general, to
determine the nature of those guarantees.
However, the severe deterioration in the French economic and financial
position over the course of 1957 called into question the French government’s
ability to put the National Assembly’s decision into effect. In December 1957
Olivier Wormser, director of economic and financial affairs at the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs and the government’s chief adviser on the FTA set out the French
government’s choices. The simple option, Wormser explained, would be to
decide not to pursue the negotiations. This would be supported by most
parliamentary and public opinion, by agricultural groups and by employers. But
such a brutal approach would have a number of external disadvantages in his
view. It would provoke an open conflict with Brita n which could have serious
economic and political consequences for France, particularly in France’s relations
with the Soviet Union. It would cause an economic crisis in Europe which would
jeopardize the Atlantic Alliance and the effective operation of NATO. Nor was it
clear that the United States would support such a French strategy, which might
make Jean Monnet’s task of negotiating a loan even more difficult. More
importantly such a negative policy would produce a crisis within the EEC. While
Italy might not react too strongly, the same would not be true of West Germany
or the Benelux. It was not certain that the EEC would survive such a crisis.
The other option was to accept a Free Trade Area Treaty which was as
close as possible to French conditions. This then raised the question of whether
time could be bought to negotiate a new treaty which incorporated French
conditions. Short of obstructing progress within the Council of Ministers
Wormser could not see how the timetable could be altered. What the French
government could do, he suggested, was to propose a delay in order to allow the
institutions of the EEC time to establish their authority. According to Wormser
the French government had to consider its options urgently and if it accepted the
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9second one, as he recommended, then it had to begin taking the steps necessary
to prepare public opinion to ensure that the reaty would be ratified by the
National Assembly. As a result France would gain credit on the international
stage for being positive in the face of adversity, he argued.13
When French ministers met on 9 January 1958 they seemed overwhelmed
by the problems of the FTA. Gaillard, the prime minister, argued that France was
not in a position to join a Free Trade Area which had even fewer guarantees than
the Common Market, which was itself a risk for France. He advised his ministers
simply to resist Maudling’s pressure to sign a treaty at that time and to
concentrate instead on studying the conditions of competition between Britain
and France.14 The fear of Christian Pineau, minister of foreign affairs, was that
France would face a repetition of the EDC fiasco if it signed a treaty under
pressure from Britain, which it would then be unable to ratify.15 In general
ministers and officials were divided between a minority who were prepared to
accept the FTA or some version of it in order to preserve good relations with the
United Kingdom and the common market countries but who did not know how to
win over public and parliamentary opinion in France; and a majority who rejected
the FTA but did not know how to make that acceptable to Britain and the
common market. The only common ground between the two positions was on the
need to change the treaty as drafted by Britain. The Quai d’Orsay, which was
prepared to accept a FTA for foreign policy reasons, hoped that a treaty which
incorporated French conditions could overcome domestic opposition. On the
other hand the Ministry of Finance hoped that during the negotiations to agree a
new treaty, France’s common market partners would come to share France’s
hostility to the whole idea of a Free Trade Area.
The French counterproposal which was finally drafted towads the end of
February 1958 owed much to the ideas of Pierre Pfimlin who had become
Minister of Finance the previous November. What Pfimlin argued was that it was
time for the French government to go on the offensive and state that its objective
was the harmonious development of the European economy. While free trade
could be a means to that end it was not an end in itself as the British maintained.
But free trade could only be achieved, he argued, through a process comparable
to that set out in the Treaty of Rome, with common policies, the harmonisation of
costs, an agricultural policy based on European agricultural preference as a
counterpart to British imperial preferences, and including at the very least a
British commitment not to play European agricultural suppliers off against each
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other; and a sectoral approach to the problem of external tariffs.16 A more f ghting
name than Free Trade Area would therefore, he argued, be a European Economic
Union.
The reaction of France’s EEC partners to its counter proposal for a
European Economic Union was one of disappointment.17 I de d Ludwig Erhard,
the liberal German Minister for the Economy, found it so unacceptable that the
French had to withhold its publication.18 The most positive response, predictably,
came from the Italian government. The Italian Minister for Foreign Trade, Guido
Carli, picking up one of the French concerns, immediately drew up a plan for
addressing the problems caused by disparities in external tariffs. Under the ‘Carli
plan’ a band for external tariffs was to be set within which goods would be
allowed to move freely. In those cases where countries preferred to impose tariffs
outside the agreed bands, compensatory taxes could be levied by countries
operating within the tariff band. The idea was that this would increase the
pressure to harmonize external tariffs and to create a customs union.19
To try to agree a common position on this and on other aspects of the
French proposals the Six set up a special commission chaired by the Belgian
representative to the OEEC, Roger Ockrent. Not only did this delay the wider
discussions within OEEC but it increased the concern of the rest of OEEC that
the Free Trade Area would not be set up at all. To mitigate the effects of the
delay and to buy time for the negotiations for the FTA, the President of the
European Commission, Walter Hallstein, proposed at the end of April 1958 that
the six common market countries should extend their tariff reductions of ten per
cent scheduled for 1 January 1959 to all members of OEEC.20
Maudling’s own view of the French position was that there was no support
at all for the FTA on economic grounds. Given that the only support was political,
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French ministers, he felt, had done little to explain this to public opinion. Whereas
they claimed in public that the Treaty of Rome was a balanced concept, unlike
the FTA, in private, as Maurice Faure then Secretary of State for foreign affairs
told Maudling, the French were satisfied that the Germans had paid a high price
for the common market in accepting the terms of association for the French
Overseas Territories and for French agricultural exports.21 One f the dangers of
the FTA for France was that it might make West Germany question the high price
which it had paid for the common market.
But were the FTA not to be agreed and were discrimination to be re-
introduced into European trade, as far as many in OEEC were concerned this
would remove the basis for providing automatic credit through the EPU, since
such credit was extended on the understanding that there was fully multilateral
trade and payments and no discrimination.  The Swiss, Norwegians and Swedes
considered that if they were discriminated against they might have to bilateralise
their arrangements with the Six.22 From the British government’s point of view
there was no question of a return to bilateral agreements for sterling. So from
Spring 1958 onwards, it began to consider how it could ensure that the EPU was
terminated as part of a concerted move to convertibility, on its own terms.  This
was to ensure that the European Monetary Agreement (EMA)23 would be brought
into force to protect the multilateralisation of trade and payments in Europe.24
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The Germans too began thinking about how best to protect the
multilateralisation of payments in Europe. Their preferred scheme, which was
much closer to British ideas than to Monnet’s, was to set up an economic
committee within OEEC to handle short-term fluctuations once European
currencies became convertible.25
DE GAULLE AND THE FREE TRADE AREA
Taking a decision on the Free Trade Area and on the European Commission’s
interim proposals was not high on de Gaulle’s list of priorities when he moved
into the Matignon on 1 June 1958. His response to the worsening financial
situation was to appoint as his Minister of Finance Antoine Pinay in the hope that
the latter would be as successful as he was judged to have been in solving the
1952 financial crisis. However disregarding any differences between the two
periods, Pinay simply adopted the same formula which was based on issuing a
loan on very favourable terms to close the domestic budget deficit whilst
tightening foreign trade controls. At the same time he offered a tax amnesty to all
holders of foreign assets who were prepared to repatriate them. In the short term
Pinay’s measures were successful. The loan brought in 824,000 million francs
and the Bank of France was able to buy more than 170 million dollars in gold.26
But unlike the situation in 1952 when France’s OEEC partners had been
sympathetic to the French government’s decision to reimpose trade restrictions, in
1958 France was under pressure to agree to the first stage of trade liberalization
in both the EEC and the FTA on 1 January 1959.
Not everyone agreed with the limited nature of Pinay’s measures.
Jacques Rueff, whose financial orthodoxy and association with Vichy had
marginalized him from political life under the Fourth Republic, saw an
opportunity to exert some influence under the new regime. Even before the details
of Pinay’s measures had been announced, Rueff visited him at his home to argue
the case for much more comprehensive reforms.27 And when de Gaulle held his
first meeting with ministers on 10 June 1958 to discuss international questions,
Wormser argued the case for accepting the European Commission’s interim
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proposals for liberalizing trade within OEEC to the same degree as within the
EEC.28
Wormser’s view was that France was too weak and vulnerable
economically, politically and financially to risk the isolation which a decision to
break off the FTA negotiations would bring. But or in his view did it have to
accept exactly what the other five were proposing as a way forward. In ddition
to the interim proposals of the Commission, the five were suggesting that
protection should be removed in the FTA on a sectoral basis, beginning with coal
and steel at the same pace as in the ECSC, and that in return for France’s
insistence on its right to veto progress from the first to the second stage of tariff
reductions, France should accept 15 years as a maximum for the transition
period.29
Wormser’s view was that the French should continue to negotiate but
should make the generalization of the Carli system a precondition for abandoning
their insistence on a three-year delay and for agreeing to a timetable for the third
stage of tariff reductions. He also felt that they should accept the Commission’s
proposals to extend the 10 per cent cut in tariffs among the Six scheduled for 1
January 1959 to all the OEEC, to counter accusations of discrimination.
Agriculture was to be excluded during the first phase of tariff reductions in order
to give the Six time to work out their own common agricultural policy.30 The
transition to the second stage would then be dependent on the 17 OEEC countries
agreeing on a policy for agriculture and avoiding any restrictions on agricultural
trade during the first stage. On the question of institutions, although the French
National Assembly had called for the institutions of the FTA to be as similar as
possible to those of the common market, Wormser now thought that this could
lead to a clash of competence and inhibit the community. What he insisted on was
that the Six should agree unanimously on the transition from the first to the
second stage as well as have a right of veto within OEEC.
De Gaulle’s main interest lay not in understanding the isolation and
weakness of the French position but rather in analysing Britain’s motives for
proposing the Free Trade Area in the first place. Having established that the
proposal was a response to the common market rather than a prior definition of
Britain’s preferred policy he agreed to meet Macmillan to have what the latter
described as “some frank talking about the FTA”.
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During the 1950s de Gaulle had made no secret of his opposition to any
form of integration which implied a loss of sovereignty. While he was careful not
to make any public pronouncements on the Treaties of Rome31 it could have been
expected that he would have found the intergovernmental arrangements of the
Free Trade Area more acceptable than the supranational nature of the European
Economic Community. Furthermore he was also known to favour a larger
geographical area than that confined to Europe of the Six. However, he was quick
to grasp the advantages to France of what had been negotiated in the Treaty of
Rome.
The view which de Gaulle formed after his meeting with Macmillan was
that Britain’s anxiety to set up a FTA did not stem from fear of the economic
damage which the EEC might cause to Britain and the rest of OEEC but was for
domestic political reasons as well as to reinforce British control over the OEEC
and over the development of Europe. Thus de Gaulle saw the FTA as primarily a
political issue for Britain rather than an economic one. The problem for France
was that its partners in the EEC did not share this interpretation of Britain’s
motives and in their support for the FTA tended to isolate and blame France for
complicating the negotiations. Si ce Adenauer refused to meet de Gaulle,
subscribing to the popular view cultivated by the German press, of de Gaulle as
an arch-nationalist opposed to the EEC,32 de Gaulle was conscious that if he
wanted to save the EEC he would not do so by antagonizing the other five over
the FTA. Thus at his first meeting with French ministers to discuss the new
government’s approach to the FTA it was agreed that the French should appear
more conciliatory in a number of respects. To this end they were prepared to:
- abandon the three-year delay in removing tariffs in the FTA;
- agree a time-limit for the removal of all tariffs (18 or even 15 years) on
condition that where serious inequality in conditions of competition persisted
or where external tariffs were not harmonized, the recourse to import taxes
remained an option;
- abandon their insistence that the Six retain full autonomy as regarded quotas.
The rules for enlarging quotas could be drawn up later and in most cases what
was agreed for the Six could be extended to the 17, they argued.
Where the French government was not prepared to grant concessions were:
(a) the right of countries to take action unilaterally without prior approval
of the institutions of the FTA;
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(b) that decisions had to be taken in the FTA unanimously, with majority
voting only possible after a trial period;
(c) OEEC would have to study the problems of competition in each sector
and the Treaty would have to contain specific rules for each sector
taking into account competition with third countries as well as internal
competition;
(d) transition from the first to the second stage would have to be decided
unanimously.
Since it was clear that a new treaty could not be drawn up on this basis by
1 January 1959 the French were prepared to accept a provisional arrangement
provided that it did not prejudice the final arrangement. The provisional
arrangement was to reduce tariffs by 10 per cent on both agricultural and
industrial goods to the extent that these tariffs exceeded the level of the Common
External Tariff (CET) regardless of whether the other 11 countries in OEEC
reciprocated. This 10 per cent reduction could even be applied if it resulted in a
tariff level below that of the CET and be extended to all countries to satisfy
GATT. To counter any criticism the French could argue that their tariffs were
more than 10per cent above the CET and that in any case they were powerless to
prevent the Benelux from making even greater tariff reductions in the first stage
of the EEC.33
Four day later, at a meeting between French and German officials, the
French government’s position was greeted with considerable satisfaction. The
same was true when all seventeen OEEC countries met on 24 and 25 July 1958.
Wormser remarked that for the first time in twelve months the discussion did not
degenerate into criticisms of the French. The Maudling Committee accepted
almost without debate Foreign Minister Couve de Murville’s34 call for tudies to
be undertaken into the specific problems which vulnerable industrial sectors
might face under a free trade regime, whereas in February the French had been
opposed sixteen to one on this issue. The task of studying arrangements for
vulnerable sectors was delegated to the Steering Board for Trade of the OEEC
which was scheduled to meet on 11September 1958. In the meantime the
Quai d’Orsay agreed that the French would supply the Steering Board with a list
of the sectors expected to be hurt by increased competition.35 The impression
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which Britain drew from the meeting was that the French government had finally
made a decision to support the FTA36 – “progress” which Adenauer ascribed to
Macmillan’s meeting with de Gaulle.37
However, this was far from being the case. At a meeting of French
ministers on 2 August 1958 the resistance of the ministries of Industry and
Finance to the sectoral studies was clear.38 Jean-Claude Achille, the directeur de
Cabinet of Edouard Ramonet, the minister of Industry and Trade, tried to argue
that to supply information on specific sectors to the OEEC Steering Board for
Trade would be in breach of the agreement to reach a common position among
the Six before discussing it with the 17. Wormser thought not, arguing that
agreement among the Six would be difficult for some sectors while it would
clearly be possible to submit some uncontentious examples to OEEC by
8 September. Although Achille promised to keep to this deadline, three weeks
later nothing had been produced.39
By 8 September 1958 when the Steering Board met, and there was still no
list from the French, the Board decided in exasperation to press on with its own
studies into five sectors – textiles, chemicals, non-ferrous metals, machinery, pulp
and paper. The fear of the Quai d’Orsay was that this renewed tension would
wreck the meeting which Adenauer had finally agreed to hold with de Gaulle.
What was important, Wormser advised, was for de Gaulle to stress to Adenauer
and his foreign minister, Von Brentano, France’s commitment to the common
market and its determination to do the maximum possible, in spite of its economic
difficulties, to meet its obligations on 1 January 1959. But it was also necessary,
he argued, to stress to the Germans the need for all six governments to act
collectively in order to ensure that the Treaty of Rome did not come into effect at
a time of economic stagnation in Europe. Furthermore Adenauer had to be told
that the proposal for a Free Trade Area continued to arouse almost universal
opposition in France, which could well compromise the Treaty of Rome unless
certain fundamental precautions were taken. Were the French government to
decide to sign a Treaty setting up a FTA, it would do so primarily for political
reasons but also on condition that it guaranteed France’s basic economic
interests, allowed fair competition and did not undermine the development of the
Treaty of Rome. If the German government remained committed to signing a FTA
                                            
36 MAE DE-CE 1945-1960, Papiers Wormser, vol. 40. Note 22 August 1958.
PRO BT 205/264, Board of Trade Progress Report. 15 October 1958.
37 PRO, FO 371/137376, Letter from Adenauer to Macmillan, 4 August 1958.
38 MAE DE-CE 1945-1960, Papiers Wormser, vol. 40. Wormer to Goetze, 22 August 1958.
39 PRO, BT 205/264, Trade Negotiations Committee. Board of Trade Progress Report n°15.
October 1958.
17
treaty it would have to support the French position and persuade Britain to make
concessions since France had made all the concessions it could.40
The meeting with Adenauer which finally took place at Colombey-les-
deux-Eglises on 14 September 1958 proved to be a meeting of minds. In wide-
ranging talks which covered the globe, both men agreed that France and
West Germany would have to cooperate closely with each other in order to make
Europe independent of the United States. De Gaulle, insisting that Europe would
have to be larger than the six common market countries, failed however to drew
Adenauer out on the subject of the FTA. All that Adenauer would say was that
Britain, whom he likened to “a rich man who had lost his fortune without yet
knowing it” was not, he believed, trying to attack the common market in
proposing the FTA.41 De Gaulle, who was not as convinced that Britain’s
intentions were so honourable, now needed to find some means of exposing
Britain’s underlying strategy, but without isolating France from its common
market partners in the process.
It was a game of cat-and-mouse, since the British were at the same time
desperately trying to work out the French position on the FTA. The day after the
meeting between de Gaulle and Adenauer, Sir Paul Gore-Booth from the
Foreign Office invited Wormser to his home. During the meeting Gore-Booth
asked Wormser directly whether the French government would be in a position to
take a decision on the FTA by the date of the next meeting of the Maudling
Committee, scheduled for 21-23 October. Without wanting to convey the
impression either that the French government was delaying things or that the Six
had not reached agreement, Wormser did not give a direct answer. But he thought
privately that it was most unlikely that the Six would reach agreement either at
Venice or Brussels. The Belgians were known to have written to Erhard
demanding that the preliminary work of the Six should be speeded – or, as
Wormser thought, botched up.42 Indeed, Wormser considered that it was not
impossible that the Foreign Office did not share Maudling’s haste since the
continued improvement in the state of British reserves might have awakened the
hope of reaching an Anglo-American economic agreement, thereby relegating the
                                            
40 MAE DE-CE 1945-1960, Papiers Wormser, vol. 40. Note 12 September 1958.
41 MAE, Cabinet du Ministre, Couve de Murville, 316. Meeting between de Gaulle and
Adenauer, 14 September 1958.
42 The concern of the Belgian minister for Foreign Trade, M. Dequae, was that failure to reach
agreement of the FTA would be blamed on the EEC Council of Ministers. CM2 1958
n°798, Dequae to Erhard, 30 September 1958. Wigny, the Belgian foreign minister, saw the
FTA as necessary to correct Belgian unemployment and economic recession. CM2 1958
n°800, Wigny’s address to the European Parliament, 23 October 1958.
18
need for a FTA.43 In some respects Wormser hit the mark. The British Chancellor
of the Exchequer, Heathcoat Amory, was to tell his American counterpart Robert
Anderson at a private meeting in New York on 27 September 1958 that the
convertibility of sterling might take place within six months. One week later at
the IMF Annual Meeting he told Karl Blessing, the president of the German
Bundesbank, the same thing. Blessing encouraged the British to act sooner rather
than later, but advised him to speak to the French government in advance.44
The key issue for France as for Britain now concerned the timing of the
move to convertibility and the necessity to be in a position to determine that
timing rather than have it imposed. What was clear was that if France were to
veto the FTA it would be held responsible for dividing Western Europe
economically. Britain would then be able to implement its one-world policy with
impunity by restoring the convertibility of sterling at a time of its choosing. It was
increasingly clear that new plans had to be made to stabilize the economy and
prepare for the convertibility of the franc. Just two days after the referendum in
which he had secured overwhelming support (80 per cent of the vote) for the new
constitution and full powers pending the elections in November and December
1958, de Gaulle set up a secret committee of nine to undertake the task. Jacques
Rueff, who at the time was serving on the Court of Justice of the European
Community, chaired the committee. Other members were bankers, M. de Vitry
d’Avancourt the President of Pechiney, and the liberal economist Professor Jean-
Marcel Jeanneney. The existence of the committee and its meetings were held
entirely in secret.45
Calculations made by the Ministry of Finance early in October showed that
French reserves were not large enough to cover French obligations in the field of
trade liberalization to both the EEC and OEEC.46 pinion was divided over
which of the two obligations had precedence. But what was clear was that to
meet both, France would have to borrow. And in view of the very difficult loan
negotiations of the previous winter, any further loans from the United States
would tie France’s hands politically. Loans from the EPU were unlikely if France
did not agree to the FTA.
When the Council of Ministers of the EEC met again on 7-8 October 1958
to discuss the FTA it finally agreed on a document to submit to the other OEEC
members on 17 October 1958. Known as the Ockrent report, it included many of
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the conditions articulated by the French in their memorandum of February 1958.
In essence it advocated that the Free Trade Area, renamed the European
Economic Association, should be as similar as possible to the EEC in content but
with different institutions. The issu s which had proved most controversial were
the absence both of a common external tariff and of a common commercial
policy.  It was suggested that the norm should be the Common External Tariff of
the Community and that the limits either side of the norm should be settled by
negotiation sector by sector – in the manner of the Carli plan. Compensating
charges would be levied, automatically and compulsorily, on products whose
tariffs fell outside these limits. If the tariff on the product in question fell within
the band but the product was made from a raw material or a semi-manufacture
whose tariff fell outside the band the product might also be liable to compensating
charges. On the question of the common trade policy towards third countries, the
Community, while accepting that a common trade policy was not an objective of
the EEA, nonetheless argued that any member which intended to change its
policy should inform the EEA. If the result of the change was seen to distort
competition for a member state, then that stage might have recourse to an escape
clause.47
The report of the Ockrent Committee, far from reassuring the French,
served only to heighten tension in Paris. Alexandre Kojève, a high-ranking
official in the Ministry of Finance, called for a change in France’s negotiating
tactics. A firm opponent of the Free Trade Area, Kojève had been one of those
who had hoped that the negotiations would have ended in the failure of the
project without any blame being attributed to France. But the reality was that
France had ended up isolated in both the EEC and OEEC. Reflecting on why
French tactics had failed, Kojève concluded that it was because France had given
the impression that it was defending its strictly national economic and maybe
even political interests based on protection and a managed economy against, if
not the ‘communautaire’ interests of the EEC, at least those of the whole 17
countries of OEEC. A second reason was that France seemed to oppose the
British conception of the FTA without wanting or being able to offer Britain
effective and fair economic or political compensation. French policy of
demanding an unconditional surrender from the British was alienating not only
Britain’s traditional allies but also France’s partners in the EEC. It was clear to
Kojève that French methods had to be altered radically. The American proposals
to GATT that the 17 OEEC countries should extend their tariff cuts of 20 per ent
to all 37 countries of GATT in 1960, implying that Europe would no longer have
any tariff preferences, gave France an additional reason for opposing the FTA and
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a new tactical weapon in doing so.48 Acc rding to the new tactics worked out by
Kojève France had to demonstrate that it was not defending its own national
political and economic interests but European interests – firstly those of the EEC
and secondly the common interests of the 17 OEEC countries in some form of
European Economic Association. While this would be based on different external
tariffs at the outset they would be preferential vis-à-vis other trading areas and
could evolve into a common tariff.
Given the state of the negotiations, it was to be supposed that a French
demand for European tariffs to be preferential in the FTA and unable to be
changed without the consent of a majority, would be enough for the British to
break off the negotiations immediately and definitively. But, as Kojève argued, it
would be Britain which would take the initiative and bear the responsibility for
the rupture. And since Holland was the only other country which was actually
opposed to European preferences, France would have the support of most
countries.
However, if the new French method of opposing the FTA were to be
immediately successful, France would have to offer the British some
compensation for their defeat. Henceforth the negotiations were to be solely
about these compensations and involve only France and Britain with the
agreement of Germany and in contact with the rest of the EEC, Kojève argued.
While he expected the negotiations to be long and difficult he felt that they had a
good chance of removing once and for all the danger of a FTA and ensuring the
continuation of the EEC. Among the concessions which he recommended was a
guarantee to maintain British exports to the EEC at their existing proportion of
EEC imports, as well as an undertaking that the Six would not take any action to
harm the Commonwealth and would share American exports equally between the
EEC and the Commonwealth. He also suggested that the Six should promise to
have ‘prior consultations’ with Britain if any action of the EEC threatened to
harm British interests or those of the Commonwealth.49
Wormser too was beginning to think that a change of tactics was
necessary. He felt that when the Maudling Committee met again on 21 October
1958 the French would be almost trapped. Up to until then the French, in playing
for time, had been forced to agree a common position with their partners in the
EEC. While this policy had worked in terms of postponing the debate with the
Eleven it was questionable whether it had worked in terms of committing
France’s partners to the agreed position. Rather, Wormser feared that at the first
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opportunity to discuss with the rest of the OEEC the other five would act
independently. What he now proposed was that at the British Foreign Office’s
second invitation to him to discuss the FTA on 14 October he should use the
opportunity to raise the new question of whether or not the British regarded the
FTA as a preferential area.
As expected, the British were quite unequivocal on the issue. Bretherton
from the Board of Trade spelt out to Wormser that Britain did not regard the FTA
as a preferential area and that France would not be entitled for example to
protection against the United States in the British market. Frank Figgures tried to
mediate by saying that since the United Kingdom was a relatively high-tariff
country the FTA would create a de f cto though not a de jure preference. But it
was made clear that the British could not accept a limitation on their freedom to
modify their tariffs, and regarded the Six as having the same liberty. At this point
Wormser simply said that this conception was interesting but disturbing and
would not be greeted with enthusiasm in Paris.50
This was an understatement. With the sectoral studies about to be
undertaken seriously by OEEC and given the atmosphere of crisis prevailing there
it seemed clear to the Quai d’Orsay that, sooner or later, a Treaty would be
signed. That treaty would specify that tariffs and quotas would be removed at the
same rate in the FTA as in the common market. The institutions would be
intergovernmental, and safeguard clauses could be invoked unilaterally. The rules
of origin would be far removed from what France wanted. External tariffs could
be changed arbitrarily. The harmonization of social conditions and of legislation
remained imperfect. Nothing positive had been achieved for agriculture. Even if
France had the right to veto progress from one stage to the next and to have
recourse to the use of safeguard clauses unilaterally, the treaty would nonetheless
commit France first and foremost to opening its frontiers without getting any of
the precise commitments which it had judged indispensable in the Treaty of
Rome, in return. The question which the French government faced was whether
the Treaty was sufficiently important to the national interest of France for the
government to overcome the increasingly strong opposition to it from professional
groups. In order to reach such a decision the government had to weigh up the fact
that if it broke off the negotiations this would cause a serious crisis among the Six
– but it was not necessarily true that the Treaty of Rome would not survive such a
crisis. What was important was that France’s partners fully understood the
implications of the FTA.
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As far as the Quai d’Orsay was concerned, British objectives had become
perfectly clear. The British government wanted to undermine the Treaty of Rome
but not to replace it with a larger Europe of 17 but with the one-world system. To
achieve this objective the British government had pursued a complicated strategy
with, in some cases, the full support of the United States. Considering the IMF
and GATT to be superior to any other treaty, aware of the divisions among the
Six and with a confidence based on the improvement of the British foreign
exchange position and by the decisions taken in New Delhi to restore the
convertibility of sterling and the Deutschmark, the British government was trying
to weaken those elements in the Treaty of Rome which had made it possible for
France to open its borders. These were first and foremost the preferential aspect
of the Common Agricultural Policy which the British government was trying to
get GATT to condemn; the right of West Germany to retain quantitative
restrictions despite the strength of the German balance of payments; the terms of
association of the overseas territories with the EEC on the grounds that they
discriminated against the interests of underdeveloped countries; and the common
external tariff. Wormser considered that British propaganda would completely
destroy the compromise reached by the Six in the Treaty of Rome. In the
circumstances, it was perhaps wise to risk provoking a crisis with its common
market partners. If they were really attached to the treaty they would not want to
see it disappear in the FTA. But in taking this risk the French government had to
be absolutely committed to respecting the obligations of the Treaty of Rome on 1
January 1959.51
Although Wormser had clearly rallied to Kojève’s view not everyone in the
Quai d’Orsay agreed with such a tough negotiating stance. François Valéry,
whilst accepting that procrastination was no longer an option, warned of the
dangers of provoking a rift in OEEC. Not only might it undermine the Atlantic
Alliance but France would lose the economic and financial benefits which OEEC
offered. These were mainly the automatic credit facilities of the EPU and the
ability to export to Europe while retaining restrictions on imports. At the very
least, he argued, France would have to honour its obligations to OEEC just as
much as to the EEC.
When the Maudling Committee met on 27 October 1958 to discuss the
Ockrent Report, Wormser tried putting the new French tactics into operation.
However in reply to his concern that the freedom of members of the FTA to
adjust their external tariffs would complicate the rules of origin, Maudling simply
said that the adoption of a code of good conduct and procedures for modifying
the rules of origin would be enough to cope with this risk without having to
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contemplate a complete standstill on external tariffs. And as far as the
coordination of commercial policy was concerned Maudling accepted the sectoral
approach written into the Ockrent Report but not that safeguard clauses could be
invoked unilaterally.52
If the French derived some satisfaction from the fact that their five common
market partners recognised that the French had raised a particularly important
point in the negotiations it was quickly dispelled by the reaction of the other five.
In their view the risks of allowing freedom to adjust tariffs were more theoretical
than real. When the German delegate proposed a compromise formula to address
these hypothetical risks it was immediately supported by the Benelux and Italy.
The formula envisaged a procedure for consultation, backed up by a majority vote
in the FTA and the introduction of safeguard clauses with the prior approval of
the institutions of the FTA. The French, despite considerable pressure from the
other five, refused to endorse this proposal. They were also isolated when the
other 16 countries agreed to give the Maudling Committee the power to set up
groups of experts to handle sectoral studies. These groups were to meet between
19 November and 10December in order to reach agreement by 31 December
1958. Couve de Murville now accepted that a defensive or dilatory stance would
be dangerous, and called for a clear political statement to be made before the next
meeting on the FTA scheduled for 13 N vember 1958.53
The occasion chosen was a meeting between Couve de Murville, Maudling
and Selwyn Lloyd on 6 November 1958. In his memoirs Couve de Murville
described the meeting as the first time that the French really stated their policy.54
Asked by Maudling whether the French could take a decision in principle in
favour of the FTA, Couve de Murville made it clear that for both economic and
political reasons they could not. The exposure to so much competition would be
too brutal for the French economy and would lead to the disappearance of the
common market, to which France attached political as well as economic
importance. Taking the offensive he argued that the objective should be to find a
solution which was acceptable to all countries and which guaranteed the survival
of the common market. He offered three possibilities. The first, which was the
one preferred by French employers, was to negotiate specific problems on a
bilateral basis. This procedure, as Couve de Murville recognised, ignored the
existence of the common market and contravened the rules of GATT. The second
option was to see how an agreement could be reached with the other eleven
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OEEC countries. But this would have to be different from the common market in
the absence of a common external tariff or policy harmonization. The third
option, which he acknowledged was not a realistic one, was for the 11 to join the
common market. As far as procedure was concerned he felt that negotiations
among 17 countries were too unwieldy to produce results and that what was
needed were prior discussions between Britain and either France or the European
Commission.
Maudling’s reaction to these suggestions was one of despair. As he saw it,
18 months had been wasted trying to prevent the common market from being a
discriminatory bloc in OEEC. What now seemed clear was that there could not be
free trade in Europe. Emphasizing that the United Kingdom did not seek the
destruction of the common market, he could not understand why Wormser had
raised the important issue of whether the FTA was to be a preferential bloc so
late in the negotiations, since the working assumption of OEEC had always been
that tariffs and quantitative restrictions on trade would be removed at the same
rhythm in both the FTA and the Common Market. Why, in that case, asked
Couve de Murville, were they discussing different treatment for different sectors?
It was precisely because there was a general agreement that tariffs and quotas
would be treated equally in the common market and the FTA that special
provision needed to be made for specific sectors, rebutted Maudling.
With Couve de Murville categorically denying that the French were saying
anything new and were not reacting, as some of the British press claimed, to the
rejection by the British and Americans of de Gaulle’s proposals for the reform of
NATO, the meeting ended with Lloyd claiming that they had reached the most
critical stage in Anglo-French relations since June 1940.55 De Gaulle confirmed
the French position later that afternoon when he met the British ambassador
Gladwyn Jebb. Equally anxious to dissociate his position on the FTA from his
proposals for the reform of NATO he stressed the economic grounds for French
rejection of the FTA.56
If the time had come to be forthright with the British, de Gaulle intended to
be equally forthright with the Germans. That same day a letter was drafted to
Adenauer explaining, “si désagréable que ce soit de le constater, il faut
aujourd’hui reconnaître que les buts que se sont assignés les gouvernements
membres de la Communauté Economique Européenne ne pourront être atteints
dans l’hypothèse où une zone de libre échange du type de celle préconisée par
M. Maudling verrait le jour”. He went on to say that “le raité de Rome est
l’objet d’attaques convergentes non seulement à l’OECE mais dans toutes les
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organisations internationales”. The moment had come, he claimed, for France
and Germany to act together to save the Treaty of Rome.57
In effect de Gaulle was asking Adenauer to demonstrate his total
commitment to the EEC by rejecting the FTA. His challenge could hardly have
come at a worse time for Adenauer. With the impending crisis over Berlin
Adenauer was being asked to choose between his two most important West
European allies and to take responsibility for the economic division of western
Europe.
Not surprisingly Adenauer did not react immediately to the challenge. The
Germans did not rally to the French position at an inconclusive OEEC meeting
held on 13-14 November. At the end of the meeting Jacques Soustelle, the
Minister for Information, finally made public what the French had been saying
privately to the British, namely that the FTA was unacceptable to France. In
exasperation Maudling immediately announced the suspension of the
negotiations, thereby falling straight into the trap laid by the French. That this was
no chance blow made by a loose cannon in the French government was confirmed
the following day in a letter written by de Gaulle to Macmillan:
“Neither the intentions nor the procedures adopted offered any chance of
achieving practical results… The very existence of the Common Market, the
obligations it imposes on the member states, the actual state of their economy, in
any case the economy of France, would be incompatible with the area as
suggested.”58
It was an increasingly desperate Macmillan who tried to retrieve situation
by telling de Gaulle that it was imperative to find a solution in view of the
increasing tension in Europe and in the rest of the world. But any resumption of
the Maudling Committee was exactly what the French had to avoid if their
strategy was to succeed. At the same time the situation had to be handled with the
utmost care since, as was pointed out, the slight deterioration in the French
payments situation meant that the first casualty of any talk of an economic war in
western Europe would be the French franc.59
At talks scheduled between de Gaulle and Adenauer on 26 November it
was expected that the French would be asked whether they remained committed
to the Ockrent Report and if so to resume negotiations within the Maudling
Committee. To avoid being placed once again on the defensive Couve de
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Murville circulated a letter to all French embassies setting out the French
position. This was that Maudling had, without consulting any members of OEEC,
chosen to break off the negotiations. His action had thereby created a new
situation, and it was this new situation which the six common market countries
had to discuss. Maudling’s action was disingenuously described as a “fit of
temper” in response to a declaration made by a French minister “who was not
even in charge of the negotiations and who in any case had said nothing new”.60
At an interministerial meeting on 18 November 1958 chaired by de Gaulle
the French ministers discussed their response to the new situation. There was a
general agreement that the five common market countries, starting with the Bonn
government, must be told of France’s commitment to honouring the Treaty of
Rome in full on 1 January 1959.61 This would entail combining the national
quotas in the non-liberalized sector given to other members of the Six and
increasing the total of these by 20 per cent. There was a further obligation that all
such common quotas must be equivalent to at least three per cent of the domestic
production of the goods concerned. For France this would mean granting quotas
where none existed. The total cost of this was estimated at 140 million dollars.
This ruled out, on financial grounds, honouring France’s obligations to OEEC,
and reliberalizing up to 82.3 per cent, which was the figure achieved in June
1957. Indeed France was under an obligation to go beyond this and liberalize up
to 90 per cent, which according to British calculations could cost 320 million
dollars. All that the French government was prepared to do within OEEC was to
reliberalize up to about 40 per cent and to increase quotas for goods previously
liberalized by 20 per cent. The total cost of this was estimated at 40 million
dollars. It was also prepared to increase by 20 p r cent its bilateral quotas to
OEEC countries of goods which had never been liberalized, subject to
reciprocity, at an estimated cost of 15 million dollars.
On this basis the French and German officials drew up a working paper
setting out the future trade relations between the EEC and the rest of OEEC,
which it was hoped could be agreed in the first instance by de Gaulle and
Adenauer. However subsequent discussions with the Germans revealed two areas
of disagreement. The first was that the German government, taking account of its
own interests as well as those of the Benelux and Britain, wanted to exclude
agriculture. The second was that the German government wanted to extend the
obligations written into the Treaty of Rome, namely that members enlarge quotas
to the value of three per cent of their national production including goods
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previously protected, to all members of OEEC. But as far as the French were
concerned this would blur the distinctions between the EEC and the rest of OEEC
to a politically unacceptable degree. Rather than concede this political point
Wormser suggested that they should offer to make concessions in the monetary
field.62 The issue was of fundamental importance to the French, since were the
distinctions between the two institutions to become less well-defined, the French
risked losing the concessions which they had won in the Treaty of Rome.
When de Gaulle and Adenauer finally met at Bad Kreuznach on
26 November 1958 their discussions were dominated, as they had been in
September 1958, by world politics. Sharing a common view that the United
States was not committed to Europe, they agreed that Europe at to become
independent of America, Russia and later Asia. But whereas Adenauer stressed
the importance of the EEC for securing that independence and the imprtance of
close Franco-German relations for the success of the EEC, de Gaulle
acknowledged that the appeal of the EEC for him was as a way of shaking up
French industry. However, whereas he had qualified his support for the common
market in September 1958 by explaining that on account of France’s protectionist
traditions his government would be obliged to take some precautions, in
November 1958 he stated quite unequivocally that the French would implement
the trade liberalization provisions of the Treaty of Rome on 1January 1959 and
not apply the safeguard clauses. After much discussion between experts the
Germans accepted the French position on the treatment of non-liberalized trade
with the rest of OEEC but remained divided over the inclusion of agriculture.63
The news that the EEC countries were going to agree a common position
before attending any further meetings of the Maudling Committee was seen by
the British as a hostile manoeuvre. But when he was told by Gladwyn Jebb of the
emotion felt in London, de Gaulle had the satisfaction of reminding him that it
had been Britain and the United States which had pushed France into the common
market in the first place.64
Although de Gaulle had stressed the vulnerability of French industry as the
main reason for rejecting the FTA it was increasingly clear that this was not his
primary concern. It was for political reasons that de Gaulle wanted to make a
distinction between the EEC and the FTA. However, by refusing to liberalize
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beyond 40 per cent with OEEC the French were on weak ground. At a meeting of
OEEC on 15 December 1958 to discuss trade relations between the EEC and the
rest of OEEC, the news that it was only the French who intended to discriminate
between the EEC and OEEC offered a further manoeuvre for the British. Britain,
as David Eccles, President of the Board of Trade, suddenly announced to OEEC,
would increase the total value of its industrial quotas by 20 per cent for each
member country and make an increase of not less than ten per ce t o  each
specific quota if the EEC extended all its quotas (including nil and negligible
ones) to all OEEC countries. If the offer was not accepted then the British would
feel free to discriminate against those EEC countries which had not fulfilled their
obligations to OEEC – which of course meant France.
The British offer exposed the fragility of the agreement reached between de
Gaulle and Adenauer at Bad Kreuznach. Erhard, as President of the Council of
Ministers of the EEC, was strongly in favour of considering the British proposal,
whereas Couve de Murville rejected it out of hand on the grounds that it
discriminated between common market countries. Once again it was the French
who were isolated in Europe.
This time it was Erhard who by prior agreement with the British suggested
a compromise to de Gaulle which broke the deadlock over trade liberalization. At
a private meeting in the afternoon of 15 December, he told de Gaulle that were
France to restore the convertibility of the franc this would avoid any scission in
Europe. “S’il s’agit de faire un pas en avant, de faire un acte de courage et
d’aborder des problèmes tels que ceux de la convertibilité, je puis vous affirmer,
et je parle au nom du Chancelier de la République Fédérale d’Allemagne, que
cette solidarité ne sera pas un vain mot pour nous.”
But this promise was accompanied by the threat that if Britain were to
restore the convertibility of sterling Germany would follow. De Gaulle confirmed
that the franc would become convertible, but not before the end of the year. He
also claimed that Britain should have stated that it saw the common market as an
ultimatum in order to create the right psychological climate for the negotiations
for the FTA to succeed. This did not happen, he said, because the negotiations
were primarily for domestic political reasons.65
Implicit in the deal was that France would have to honour its obligations to
OEEC as well as making the franc convertible. Although the list published by the
French on 18 December indicating which products would be freed from quotas
only covered 40 per cent,66 Pinay was to tell Gladwyn Jebb on 19 December that
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the decision had been taken to liberalize 90 per cent. Acknowledging that this
would result in grave distress for the smaller French industries and even produce
a number of bankruptcies he stated firmly that the days of protectionism were
coming to an end and that the only hope for these industries was to revise their
prices in order to compete.67
What accounted for the change in policy? When the Rueff Committee had
submitted its report on 8 December 1958, in addition to recommending a number
of domestic deflationary measures it had called for the restoration as a minimum
of the 1957 degree of trade liberalization within OEEC in order to exert
downward pressure on French prices and to make French industry more
competitive.68 The report made no mention of devaluation, so great were the
differences of opinion among the members of the Committee. Jean Saltes, deputy
Governor of the Bank of France, argued that if France were capable of
maintaining a policy of financial rigour no change in the exchange rate would be
necessary. If not, and the franc were devaluated, it would be just as difficult to
maintain the new parity as the old.69 H wever, once the government had accepted
the obligation to liberalize trade with OEEC up to 90 per cent, the case for
devaluation was strengthened. It was not a decision, though, which de Gaulle was
prepared to take until after he had won the presidential elections of 21D ember
1958 with a majority of 78.5 per cent of the electoral college.
The response to the decision to implement the Rueff plan, including
devaluation and convertibility, was immediate. Foreign currency flowed into
France which, together with the upturn in international demand, ensured that the
effects of the devaluation and trade liberalization would not plunge the French
balance of payments into deficit once again. France had established itself as the
defender of the EEC and the ally of West Germany, and had compensated Britain
for the defeat of the FTA.
CONCLUSIONS
De Gaulle’s decision to implement the Rueff plan and devaluate the franc
was the price which had to be paid to secure the future of the EEC ad French
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leadership of it. That France had to pay such a price was due to the failure of its
tactics in the FTA negotiations.
The FTA proposals had initially divided the French with François Valéry,
head of the Economic Cooperation Section of the Quai d’Orsay, in particular
arguing in their favour. However, the worsening financial situation aggravated by
the war in Algeria was to make Valéry’s a minority opinion. The policy adopted
from February 1958 onwards and to which de Gaulle subscribed was based on
convincing France’s EEC partners to oppose the FTA. De Gaulle, who had been
no supporter of the EEC, saw the issue as a power struggle between France and
Britain over who should control the economic development of Europe. At the
heart of the struggle was the need to win the support of the Federal Republic of
Germany. Although Adenauer shared de Gaulle’s distrust of the United States he
did not extend this to the United Kingdom. His basic sympathy for Britain
together with Ludwig Erhard’s positive endorsement of the FTA was to force de
Gaulle to try to turn the EEC into a Franco-German alliance in order to defeat the
FTA. But not even the pledge of French troops to defend Berlin against a Soviet
attack, nor de Gaulle’s full commitment not to employ safeguard clauses and to
honour the trade liberalization provisions of the Treaty of Rome on 1 January
1959 were enough. The only terms on which the Germans would accept the
economic division of Europe was if it was not also a monetary division. To argue
as Gérard Bossuat does that the consensus of the six EEC countries in December
1958 in the face of British threats to discriminate if they were discriminated
against depended solely upon the good relations of de Gaulle and Adenauer is to
ignore the monetary dimension.70 Had de Gaulle not agreed to restore the
convertibility of the franc and honour France’s obligations to both the OEEC and
the EEC on 1 January 1959, the consensus among the Six would have
evaporated. The Rueff plan had become a political necessity.
The author thanks the Leverhulme Trust for their assistance in funding the
research on which this paper is based, and Lise Rye Svartvatn for her help.
                                            
70 Gérard Bossuat, L’Europe des Français, (Paris 1996, 395).
31
REFERENCES
Arnaud-Ameller, P. (1968) Mesures économiques et financières de décembre
1958, Paris.
Bloemen, E. (1995) “A Problem to every Solution. The Six and the Free Trade
Area”, in Olesen, T. (ed), Interdependence versus Integration. Denmark,
Scandinavia and Western Europe 1945-1960, Odense.
Bossuat, G. (1996) L’Europe des Français, Paris.
Camps, M. (1965) Britain and the European Community, 1955-1963, Princeton
and London.
Cohen, W. B. (1992) “De Gaulle et l’Europe d’avant 1958”, in Institut Charles
de Gaulle, De Gaulle en son siècle. Tome 5, L’Europe, Paris
Couve de Murville. M. (1971), Une politique étrangère, 1958-1969, Paris.
Franck, L. (1990) 697 ministres. Souvenirs d’un directeur général des prix
1947-1962, Paris.
Institut Charles de Gaulle (1986) La faillite ou le miracle. Le Plan de Gaulle-
Rueff, Paris.
Kaplan, J. and Schleiminger, G. (1989) The European Payments Union, Oxford.
Madelin, A. (ed) (1997) Aux sources du modèle libéral français, Paris.
Rueff, J. (1972) Combats pour l’ordre financier, Paris.
Shennan, A. (1993) De Gaulle, London.
Winand, P. (1993) Eisenhower, Kennedy and the United States of Europe,
London.
